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In the United States, recent years saw an explosion of interest in government regulation 
of private enterprises, among legislative committees and business associations as well as in 
the academic circle. This reflects, of course, the rapid growth of regulation itself, especially 
during the last two decades. In reaction, the administration initiated partial and gradual 
deregulation of airline and telecommunication industries lately, and is contemplating further 
deregulation. 
While interest groups such as business enterprises and their organizations, labor unions 
.and agricultural cooperatives may be equally or more important in influencing the shape of 
American industrial society, it is of utmost significance to understand the role of regulatory 
agencies. This is because the regulation in the present form is a distinctly American insti-
tution, by no means equally observable in other industrialized countries. Standing somewhat 
mogically between the free market and public ownership, this administrative form of 
intervention began to take roots as the state governments regulated public utilities and 
transportation in the nineteenth century. Federal regulation grew by leaps and bounds in 
its size and power, since the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. 
The proliferation of government regulation heightened the cultural and ideological tension 
between individualism and communitarianism, the inescapable tradeoffs between efficiency 
and equity, and the contest between economic growth and environmental quality. Also of 
issue is the debate over the advantages and disadvantages of adversarial business-government 
relations compared with cooperative ones. At a preliminary look, the antagonism between 
business and government, a long-standing uniquely American tradition, seems to have 
resulted from the political power of the victims of the big business, and from the lateness 
in the evolution of public bureaucracy. 
These issues and others are examined in the rest of the paper. Discussion of the growth, 
function and process of government regulation is followed by a section on the historical 
background. Later, an illustrative attention will be given to the first federal regulatory 
agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission. Tentative evaluation, perspective and pro-
spective, will close the paper. 
1. 
Government regulation of business in the United States began to take the present form 
in the last third of the 19th century, at the same time when modern big corporations took 
their roots. Prior to this period, Americans had placed their faith in the market that com-
petition always protected the public interest; the early democratic ideal had agreed to the 
doctrine of minimum government interference. One way or another perception of the failure 
of the market competition grew, and regulation first appeared for those industries where 
this perception was greatest. Municipal authorities, and later state commissions controlled 
transportation, communication, water supply, gas and electricity industries. Since 1887, 
federal agencies participated. 
Regulatory agencies have set prices and certified the services of utilities and of companies 
providing transportation of passengers and freight. Within the last two decades, regulatory 
controls have been extended to cover, directly, natural gas and petroleum products companies 
and, indirectly, health service organizations. Regulation has spread even further as state 
and federal agencie~; have been set up to control environmental quality and workplace 
health and safety conditions throughout all of industry and trade. By the 1970's, regulation 
had begun to have substantial effects not only on the provision of goods and services 
in certain markets but also on the overall economic condition of the country. 
Traditionally controls have centered on regulating prices and entry of companies in 
interstate transportation, communications, electricity production, and pipeline transportation. 
The federal and state agencies performing these functions are indicated in Table 1. In most 
of these industries, price levels have been controlled by commission or agency review in 
courtlike proceedings on company requests for increases. At both the state and federal levels 
of government, commissions have also determined price differences for varying types of 
service and have set entry conditions into most or all markets providing these serVIces. 
They have monitored service quality and extended service coverage to include new com-
munities, customers and conveniences. These commissions and agencies were established to 
protect public interest from monopolistic or oligopolistic practices of the suppliers. 
Regulation was not limited to such price-control and service-enhancement policies. It was 
part of a number oCearly attempts to improve health, safety, and working conditions as 
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and retail distribution 
Telephone services 
Airline services 
Highway freight services 
Railroad transportation 
Jurisdiction and extent of regulation 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and 49 state agencies control 
prices; 35 state agencies certify service. 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission controls interstate transportation 
and 49 state agencies set rates for distribution. 
Federal Communications Commission and 50 state agenciES set rates; 
entry, and service conditions. 
Civil Aeronautics Board regulations set fares and entry conditions before 
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978; 21 state agencies set fare and 
entry conditions interstate. 
Interstate Commerce Commission and 47 state agencies regulate rates; 
the ICC and 45 state agencies control entry into common-carrier services. 
Interstate Commerce Commission and 44 state agencies set freight rates; 
the ICC and 26 state agencies certify entry into the provision of rail 
services. 
Source: The Challenge of Regulatory Reform: A Report to the President from the Domestic Council 
Review Group on Regulatory Reform (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovEll'lI.tnt FrintingCfEce, 
1977), pp.50-51. 
welL Particularly important initiativEs were the Feed and Drug Administration, set up in 
1931, and the Federal Aviation Administration, set up in 1948. They servEd as models 
for setting standards to improve product or service safety. However, the majority of 
federal agencies that are responsible for setting . performance standards were established 
in the 1970's (See Table 2). The most significant of these are the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA). Both have had an impact on production conditions in almost every industry. 
The agency having the most comprehensive authority in a single industry is the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which sets performance standards for 
automobiles. 
These regulatory organizations have mostly been justified on grounds that private pro-
ducers fail to take account of the full social costs of their activities. Where this results in 
unhealthy conditions, controls should require the companies to provide more health and 
safety. The rationales of particular agencies imply different kinds of regulation, but the 
general basis of operations for all these new agencies is to prevent harm from a process, 
product, or their side effects. 
How extensive is the coverage of the economy by regulation? The coverage of controls 
is indicated by accumulating industry by industry the share of national output produced 
Table 2, Regulating Health, Safety, and the Quality .0£ the Environment 
Organization 
The Packers and Stockyards Admini-
stration' Department of Agriculture 
The Food and Drug Administration, 
Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare 
The Agricultural Marketing Service, 
Department of Agriculture 
The Federal Aviation Administration, 
Department of Transportation 
The Animal anlPlant Health Inspection 
Service, Department of Agriculture 
The Federal Highway Administration, 
Department of Transportation 
The Federal Railroad Administration, 
Department of Transportation 
The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, Department of Trans-
portation 
The Envitonmental Protection Agency 
The Consumer Product Safety Commission 
The Mining Enforcement and Safety 
Administration, Department of the 
Interior 
The Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Department of Justice 
The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, Department of Labor 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Regulatory function Year established 
Determines plant conditions and business practices 
in livestock and processed-meat production so as 
to provide healthful meat products. 
Controls the labeling and content of foods and 
drugs. 
Determines healthful standards for most farm 
commodities and also sets minimum prices for milk 
in some areas. 
Operates air-traffic-control systems and sets safety 
standards for aircraft and airports to reduce acci-
dents. 
Sets standards for plant safety and inspects and 
enforces laws relating to meat and poultry quality. 
Sets safety regulations for interstate trucking 
services. 
Sets safety standards for interstate railroad trans-
portation. 
Sets safety standards for automobiles so as to 
reduce highway accident fatalities. 
Develops environmental quality standards and 
approves abatement plans operated by state agencies 
to curtail individual industry pollution emissions. 
Sets product safety standards. 
Sets mine safety standards. 
Controls trade in narcotics and drugs. 
Sets and enforces workers safety and health regula-
tions to reduce work-related accident and disease. 
Licenses the construction and operation of civilian 
















Source: The Challenge of Regulatory Reform: A Report to the President from the Domestic Coun-
cil Review Group on Regulatory Reform (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977), pp. 50-54. 
under regulation (as in Table 3). The nationa,lproduct of the public utilities and the 
transportation companies under the jurisdiction of price-regulating commissions accounts for 
more than 5 percent of total gross national product. When this regulatory process was 
extended to petroleum production, refining, and marketing in the mid-1970s, another 3 
Table 3. Percent of GNP in the Regulated Sector of the Economy 
Price Regulation 
Financial markets Regulation 












Source: P.W. MacAvoy, The Regulated Industries and the Economy (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Co., 1979), p.25. 
percent of GNP was brought under agency serveillance. The financial sector, accounting 
for approximately 3 percent of GNP, typically has had controls on entry, service offerings, 
and interest rates, at either the national or state level. 
By far the most significant growth of regulation, in terms of coverage of the economy, 
occurred with the establishment of agencies to increase workers' health and safety (9SHA) 
and to protect the environment (EPA). Their controls cover virtually every manufacturer 
regardless of industry. In practice, however, only a few industries were seriously enough 
affected to adjust pricing, production, and investment decisions; the other industries were 
not significantly affected because their particular processes allowed with virtually costless 
adoption of the rules or, more likely, because standards and enforcement had not been 
worked out for them. 
The mining, construction, and chemical industries were regulated in. the sense that large 
parts of their investments had been diverted to meet regulatory equipment requirements. 
The paper, primary metal, motor vehicle, stone, clay and glass product, and petroleum 
refining industries were not required to make such investments in plant and equipment, 
but their key production processes or products were controlled from specific work-safety 
rules and pollution-emission restrictions. These industries together produce almost 12 percent 
of GNP. Thus the regulated sector of the economy comprises nearly 24 percent of GNP 
(as shown in Table 3). 
Another indicator of the growth of regulation is the total personnel employed by selected 
federal agencies. Table 4 evidently shows that the growth was constant throughout. 
2. 
Although regulatory institutions assume such a variety of functions as mentioned above, 
they can be classified into four major categories: policing, rationalization, standard setting, 
Table 4. The Growth of Federal Regulation in America: Personnel of Sdected Agencies, 1935-1977 
"Economic" Regulation Agencies 
1935 1945 1960 1975 
-----" 
Interstate Commerce Commission (1887) 1, 093 1, 817 2,409 2,142 
Federal Trade Commission (1914) 527 484 756 1, 569 
Federal Power Commission (1920) 70 723 850 1, 320 
Federal Communications Commission (1934) 234 1, 757 1, 454 2,022 
Securities and Exchange Commission (1934) I"') 80 1, 249 1, 000 2, 150 
Civil Aeronautics Board (1938) 385 766 713 
"Social" or "Environmental" Regulation Agencies 
1970 1973 1977 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1964) 780 1, 739 2,377 
Environmental Protection Agency (1970) 3,702 8,270 9,550 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (1970) 1,285 2,306 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (1972) 579 890 
Source: Thomas K. McCraw, "Regulation in America: A Review Article," Business History Review 
49 (Summer, 1975). 
and interest representation. 
The public interest image of regulation presumes that under the command of government 
directive businesses are forced to pursue goals which, left to their own, they would not 
pursue. Numerous examples of successful preemptive or policing powers exercised by 
regulatory agencies and the judiciary can be found. Antitrust doctrine has been consistently 
hostile to private agreements that create the danger of cartelization or other exercises of 
power against consumers. 
Granting of sovereign public powers to private agents is another form of policing. For 
instance, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., since 1939 has undertaken a 
major role in policing the trading practices of over-the-counter dealers. Under the constant 
threat of losing its autonomy to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the association 
has provided effective watchdog functions and disciplinary actions against member firms. 
Another area in which regulation has functioned to police business behavior is in envi-
ronmental, health, and safety regulation. The role of statutory agencies in assessing and 
setting acceptable levels of risk in these areas has been to open the process to scientific 
theories, information, and goals which historically had not entered into private business 
decision criteria. Thus, as well as directing business to meet new, often more stringent 
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standards, social regulation has forced business firms and their research divisions to consider 
outside sources of information in their own decision making. 
Scientific rationalization was also a motive force behind the notion of industrial regulation. 
By replacing market transactions with publicly and privately planned factor procurement 
and output schedules, business-government associationalism could serve the public interest. 
The "progressive cartel" could regulate competition, not to maintain explosive prices, but 
to serve the ends of efficiency. Under what conditions were asscciational structures r:;ossible 
or successful? More particularly, can we refine the notion of rationalization as a function 
of regulation? In the 1930s rationalization of this type served to prop up ailing industries 
or to promote industries such as aviation that had yet to secure a reliable market. 
Regardless of who benefits from business regulation, setting standards for products and 
services is always a central function in the regulatory process. Setting standards increases 
reliabiiity and certainty in market transactions and in the. relations between business and 
the state. Moreover, reliable and accessible information is imJCortant to consumers, producers, 
and government regulators. How and why government has assumed the function of standard 
setting in specific contexts is a continuing problem for students of regulation. 
In addition to increasing the reliability of transactions between buyers and sellers, stan-
daros also served competitive and anti competitive purposes in relations between producers. 
Standardization was a precondition for price fixing, since without it firms had no consistent 
criteria to compare their own product prices with those of competitors. On the other hand,. 
standard setting could result from shared, rather than competitive, incentives among pro-
ducers. Unlike voluntary price-setting associations, in which members had an incentive to 
defect from cooperative agreements, standard-setting associations created market signals that 
established the honesty and reliability of member firms in an industry to fail to comply 
with industrywide standards, then, was to signal that its product was presumptively defective 
or the firm itself dishonest. 
If standards emerged inherently from private market transactions and were effectively 
enforced on the basis of private incentives, then how can one explain the functions that 
state regulators have assumed in standard setting? First, the state can lend legitimacy to 
privately set standards-a government stamp of approval, particularly in flodging or crisis-
ridden industries, tended to engender confidence in the minds of consumers. But government 
standard setting can serve ends other than consumer confidence. In the securities industry, 
financial disclosure was a precondition to any form of effective market regulation. And 
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meaningful disclosure necessarily involved standard accounting procedures, which, by and 
large, did not exist prior to the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
1934. Thus, in this case the impetus for standard setting came primarily from government, 
in alliance with the accounting profession. As a result, power over setting standard accoun-
ting procedures ultimately came to be shared between the profession and the commission. 
Standard setting in the area of occupational health and radiation exposure was initiated 
by industry and professionals, with only marginal government involvement. The National 
Council of Radiation Protection, for instance, was a nonstatutory body which, unlike OSHA 
and EPA, had virtually no power to open the standard-setting process to sources of scien-
tific information other than industry. It grew up simply as a device to facilitate communi-
cation between industry and professionals, and was replaced by statutory agencies as pro-
fessionals with new and conflicting sources of information pressed for access into the tightly 
knit group that was setting exposure standards previously. 
In the years since the New Deal, politics over the distribution of wealth and investment 
and the debate over corporate power and discretion have progressively shifted from political 
parties and Congress to administrative agencies and other public bureaucracies. Administra-
tive regulation has become, more and more, an area for political struggle over health and 
safety risk in advanced industrial society, over the location and substance of investment, 
and over the social responsibility of business in American life. 
A variety of explanations were offered for the dramatic increase in the interest-representa-
tion functions assumed by regulatory agencies since the 1960s. The fragmented structure of 
American political institutions provided one answer: if groups could not secure access through 
political parties or Congress, they turned to the courts or directly to the point of allocation 
-administration for representation. It is precisely this kind of institutional pluralism in the 
United States that has allowed "a radical redistribution of power sin.ce 1960s; without 
a redistribution of wealth." The courts were instrumental in realizing functional represen-
tation for new and underrepresented groups. Under the public interest mantle, the courts 
declared that previous administrative practices had systematically underrepresented some 
groups in American society. As a result, consumer, minority, environmental, and women's 
groups, backed by the force of law, waged political battles in areas traditionally limited to 
access by business alone. 
Another explanation emphasized the formation and motivations of new interest groups 
in American politics. Leisure and intangible consumption have brought individuals together 
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into recreational organizations and that these voluntary associations have subsequently 
turned to political activity in order to have their concerns with environmentaJ, quality of 
life, and health and safety issues represented in the formation of administrative policy. 
Other explanations noted the effects of foundation and public money, mass media and mass 
mailing techniques in lowering the costs of organization for groups seeking access to 
administrative procedure. 
3. 
What do these regulatory agencies actually do and how do they do it? Each regulatory 
agency begins with a different function, but a uniformity of process can be observed which 
allows generalizations about performance. Each agency has political appointees as executives 
to make decisions, a permanent staff to administer the decisions, and substantial financial 
support to carry out operations. Decisions and operations are to carry out the mandate in 
the statute provided by the legislature. As the agency develops, these procedures and 
decisions, if not goals, tend to resemble other agencies. A set of rather narrow practices 
becomes controlling with respect to case decisions. Thus the regulatory organization's 
behavior may well be predictable within a range. 
Regardless of the industry being regulated, the various agencies, boards, and commissions 
use many of the same arguments and factual indicators of conditions. Although they res-
pond to the requests of the companies for changes by taking a wide range of testimony 
and evidence, in practice certain physical and financial accounting measures of previous 
activities are used as the basis for their decisions. This accounting approach to evidence is 
constraining in ways that maintain decisions and thus establish the behavior of the regulated 
companies. In price-regulation cases, revenue increases are justified by changes in historical 
costs as shown in financial reports. In health or safety regulations, controls are placed on 
equipment specified by engineering studies. This results in present and near-future behavior 
set in line with past performance, and thus in marked stability when compared with change 
in the unregulated industries. 
There are a number of factors, but principally two, that make for such operating uni-
formity. First, the legislative mandates of different agencies have been similar, in some 
cases going so far as to couch their purposes in the same language. For instance, the goals 
in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887-stabilizing prices, expanding service, and promoting 
equity in railroad fare structures-were repeated in later transportation regulatory statutes. 
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Both state and national statutes establishing agencies to control' the prices of electricity, 
gas, and telephone services repeated admonitions against discriminatory, unstable, and high 
prices, and most also set out requirements for more and better service in these industries. 
To be sure, the commissions controlling health, safety, and environmental conditions were 
called upon to solve different problems, but even then similarities of language in limiting 
controls to what was practicable in the market implied application of roughly the same 
process as for calculating costs in price regulation. 
The second factor has been the Administrative Procedures Act and its recourse to court 
review. This general law sets requirements for open hearings, presentation of evidence, and 
case-decision justification in most of the agencies, By allowing the courts to review the 
agency's decisions for openness of process and due consideration of the evidence presented, 
the act naturally leads agencies to emphasize quantitative rather than judgmental or predic-
tive materials. The courtlikeproceedings under the act emphasize evidence on existing 
conditions, thereby taking less account of future or present opportunity losses from alter-
natives not in operation. The expanding scope of judicial review has encompassed issues not 
only as to whether a statute is being complied with, but also whether the procedures chosen 
by the agencies are "reasonable," and whether the results themselves are reasonable. The 
determination to avoid unfavorable review on these new issues has required the agencies 
to establish even more procedural conformity. 
This case process has itself set limits on price increases in the public utility and trans-
portation industries. The agencies evaluate requests for price or rate increases by holding 
them to the sum of recent period operating costs, depreciation, and taxes along with a 
"reasonable profit." The profit estimates mostly are arrived at by multiplying a determined 
"reasonable" rate of return by the capital rate base, which consists of the total undepreci-
ated original costs of capital equipment. Once the agency has concluded what should be 
total expenses and profit, prices are then set by the company so as to result in revenues 
not exceeding this allowance. Of course, judgmental elements are part of this process, 
'centrally in determining the reasonable rate of return. But even in profit determination 
there has been a tendency, as established by example and repetition, to use estimates within 
a narrow range since they come from publicly accepted sources, such as from accounting 
compilations of recent earned rates of return of other utility companies. In general the 
process has centered on the calculation of cost and profit averages from historical accounting 
data as the basis for future prices. Because of this, the results across price control agencies 
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have had a tendency to be similar across cases and over time. 
The agencies conducting health and safety regulation have developed a process as well. 
What has evolv~d over the years in prolonged adversary proceedings are detailed quantitative 
specifications of equipment or operating conditions. These specifications are easier to certify 
and enforce than other kinds of standards. They are designed to control indirectly the 
company's performance. as to health conditions, operating safety, or environmental quality. 
However, in a number of instances, the standards have become the focus of decision making 
to such an extent that they departed widely from performance goals. As with pricing con-
trols, the courts and Congress have had their impact with respect to accountability, and 
this has resulted in a high degree of specificity in certification of operating practices ril-ther 
than of the actual health effects in company performance. 
41. 
The growth of the administrative form of intervention has its deep root in the antagonism 
between business and government, a long-standing American tradition. It dates back to the 
19th century anti-trust question. 
The trust movement-that is, the powerful tendency of businessmen to cooperate with 
competitors in associations or mergers-grew out of a particular problem of industrializa-
tion. This was the problem of periodic industrial overcapacity tied to the boom-and-bust 
cycles of the late 19th century economy. Just as worldwide overcapacity lies behind the 
periodic "sickness" of such contemporary industries as steel, fibers, footwear, and automo-
biles, so in the late 19th century industrial overcapacity plagued the economies of all 
d.eveloped nations. 
The underlying reason was the industrial revolution, which initially took the form of a 
revolution in production. Corresponding progress in distribution, marketing, and consumer 
purchasing power lagged behind production, and sometimes far behind. This created a 
serious periodic imbalance between nations' capacity to produce and their ability to consume. 
In some respects this sequence was natural and inevitable. However, it was dramatically 
serious in the United States between 1880 and 1920. As is now familiar thanks to the 
monumental study by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., the four decades transformed the American 
economy profoundly; the present day industrial scene of the world was formulated almost 
entirely during the period. Mass production and mass distribution integrated in consolidated 
big corporations, managed by scientific techniques in carefully chosen organizational structure, 
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funded by modern financial market.... everything was established at the same period in a. 
revolutionary speed. The truest measure of what was happening during this era, just as it 
is the truest measure today, was productivity. The best estimates suggest that the annual 
increase in total factor productivity, which had held remarkably steady at roughly 0.3 
percent for most of the 19th century, began to rise very rapidly in the closing decades. So 
violent was this spurt that the figure for 1889rv1919 reached nearly six times the rate that 
had prevailed for most of the 19th century. During this phase, then the industrial revolution 
was primarily a revolution in production and productivity. 
With rising productivity came overcapacity, not only in the United States but throughout 
the industrialized world, as reflected in the worldwide price declines characteristic of the 
period. Among businessmen in every industrial nation, the natural initial response to 
overcapacity, especially in periods of recession and depression, was to combine with each 
other to limit the total output of their plants, maintain the price levels of their goods, and 
discourage the entry of new firms into their line of business. 
Industrialists felt a powerful urge to maintain a market for their products, if necessary 
by temporarily selling below costs, if possible by cooperating with each other for the mutual 
protection of their capital and their own survival of gyrations in the business cycle. 
In Europe, this inclination to combine in self-defense against overcapacity had very 
different results from those in the United States. The response was by no means identical 
all over the continent, but in general Europeans accepted business combinations far more 
readily than did Americans. Price and production cartels, set up in every country and in 
many different industries in response to the overcapacity problem, usually enjoyed the official 
sanction of the state. The law was actually on the side of cartels, and the machinery of 
the state could be used to enforce contractual articles of cartelization against rebellious price 
cutters. In Europe, with its large public bureaucracies long in place, and where government 
had always had a prominent role in the affairs of business, industrial overcapacity was in 
this sense simply another new problem for a mature state to help manage. The official 
sanction of cartels was a convenient way for governments to keep peace within troubled 
industries and among the major sectors of the economy-manufacturing, transportation, 
wholesaling, retailing. The rise and success of cartels in these sectors tended to soften and 
stabilize the industr:lalization process by protecting the vested interests of participating firms. 
Direct harm to individual companies was thereby minimized. Consequently, in Europe there 
were fewer of the internecine business wars so characteristic of the more fluid and indeter-
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minate American context. 
This is not to say that industrial peace prevailed on the continent during the late 19th 
century. It is clear, however, that in Europe the typical political battles pitted a fairly 
united business community against a powerful but factionalized labor movement. In the 
United States, by contrast, with its less mature proletariat, the labor question-despite 
periodic strikes and violence-was less salient. Instead, the customary political warfare 
found one group of businessmen faced off against another: carriers versus shoppers, commo- . 
dity farmers against mortgage bankers, small .wholesalers and shopkeepers against large 
firms whose marketing divisions were displacing traditional jobbers and retailers. Again in 
vivid contrast to Europe, the tiny size of the United States government meant that no 
public bureaucracy existed to manage these conflicts. Within such a context, the emerging 
overcapacity problem, compounded by the boom-and-bust business cycle, moved immediately 
into the realm of public controversy. And to a degree sometimes underestimated by scholars, 
it underlay nearly every major economic issue of the period: not only the trust question, 
but also the perennial and dIvisive battles over the protective tariff, the railroad rate 
problem, and the imperial quest for foreign markets to absorb surplus productions. 
The initial response to industrial overcapacity in America took much the same form it 
took in Europe. American businessmen, like their counterparts abroad, energetically com-
bined with each other in loose cartels designed to limit production, maintain prices, and 
divide markets so that all could survive. The array of formal and informal associations 
erected for this purpose within the United States in the 1870s and 1880s soon numbered in 
the thousands. Seldom, however, did these early cartels accomplish their purpose, because 
they encountered intractable legal obstacles. The common law and the national culture were 
so inveterately opposed to monopoly and "restraint of trade" that American courts refused 
to enforce cartel arrangements against recalcitrant members. Thus, in a fashion that would 
have been difficult in Europe, American businessmen participating in cartels were free to 
cut their prices in violation of the agreements or sell their products outside areas demarcated 
by the cartel. The passage in 1890 of the Sherman Antitrust Act formalized the common 
law's hostility and compelled the Department of Justice eventually to be an active opponent 
of cartel behavior. Despite the indifference of the first attorneys general who dealt with it, 
the act was soon to have an enormous and in part unexpected impact. 
The same background has the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, and 
the beginning of large scale federal administrative regulation. In short, it is a product of 
the business-government antagonism, manifested by the political power of the· "victims" of 
the big business, and by the lagging evolution of public bureaucracy. 
5. 
Railroad industry sets the pattern of federal regulation as in so many other ways: the 
first big business, modern management, large scale fund raising, the first oligopolistic 
competition across state boundaries. 
In the late 19th century, as the "railroad problem" grew to national scope, its nature 
became more and more comJ?lex. In the East the problem sometimes took the form of 
excessive competition, with too many roads handling too little traffic. In the West and 
South, by contrast, it could take the form of too little competition. Whole communities 
complained of monopoly, as they depended on single railroad corporations for their very 
existence. And in aU regions the railroads often exhibited tendencies toward frenzied finance, 
corporate arrogance, and discriminatory pricing practices that, however logically they might 
flow from the economics of railroading, nevertheless appeared to. violate basic notions of 
fairness. Underlying the entire "railroad problem" was the political incongruity of a demo-
cratic society in the role of handmaiden to one of its industries. Ultimately the railroad 
industry grew so powerful and vital to the national economy that continued reliance on 
state regulation was plainly futile. 
The greatest significance of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 lay in its creation of 
the prototype federal regulatory tribunaL Most of the later federal commissions were more 
or less patterned on the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in appointment and tenure 
of members and in relationships with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
government (see figure). It is a measure of the success the ICC had in its first fifty years, 
or was perceived as having had, that the pattern was so often repeated in the creation of 
new agencies. The ICC begin life in 1887 with several missions, not all of which were 
easily consistent with each other or with the inherent nature of the railroad industry. The 
Interstate Commerce Act forbade pooling, rebating, and-with certain important exceptions 
-rate discrimination between long-haul and short-haul traffic. The statute insisted that 
railroad rates be "just and reasonable"; and it provided a new arena, the ICC, in which 
determinations of reasonableness could occur. The five members of the commission were to 
be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, for the terms of six (later 
seven) years: 
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In response to continuing problems within the railroad industry, and problems between 
the ICC and the judiciary, Congress steadily added to the authority of the commission and 
broadened its jurisdiction through a series of supporting legislation: among others, the 
Hepburn Act (1906), giving the commission power to fix maximal rates; the Esch-Cummins 
Act (1920), empowering the commission to set minimal rate as well and to regulate entry. 
In order to establish rate setting standards, the ICC had carried out an enormous inventory 
of railroad properties, so called the Railroad V alua tion (early 1920s). The Motor Carrier 
Act (1935) added the regulation of trucking to the missions of the ICC and thereby increased 
its work load substantially. 
Throughout its history the ICC has remained controversial. Sometimes, as in the Pro-
gressive era (1901'""-'1920), it has been the target of industry criticism that it infringes on 
the prerogatives of management and wields pricing authority without responsibility for the 
consequences. More often, consumer groups have accused it of protecting "the the carriers at 
the expense of the general public. Sometimes critics with entirely different viewpoints have 
joined in blaming the ICC for the almost uninterrupted decline in rail service. But the most 
damning criticism of the ICC has been on the grounds of economic inefficiency. This line 
of argument holds that the commission has prevented competitive market forces from auto-
matically selecting the optimal modes of moving different types of freight, and that it has 
thereby injected an institutional inefficiency into the national system of freight transport, 
at great cost to society. 
Of recent interest is the debate over the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act. The 
traditional view held that the ICC had been created to protect consumers' (farmers' and 
merchants') interests against the market power or the railroad industry, particularly the 
cartels. The revisionist view, pioneered by Gabriel Kolko, claimed that the principal agitators 
for the federal regulation were not the consumers but the railroads. The ICC would serve 
as a cartel manager, and bring to an end the cut-throat rate wars from which the railroads 
had gravely suffered by then. 
These opposing views were conceived mainly through the investigation of court rulings, 
legislative documents, lobbyist's pamphlets, and other qualitative materials. In contrast, 
economists' approach to the question of regulation has been to build a formal model that 
will predict different behavior and performance of the firms according to different hypothesis, 
and marshall evidence against the model to determine which view fits the data better. 
The first major work of economist on the railroad regulation by the ICC was that of 
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Paul MacAvoy. He examined the rates charged on dead freight transport and the profits of 
railroads that operated between Chicago and Atlantic seaboard ports from the mid-1870s to 
the late 1890s. His findings, among others, were that during the years before the passage 
of the Interstate Commerce Act (1879"-'1886), the collusive efforts among the trunk line 
railroads had been' unsuccessful with low price-adherence and low profits. For the years 
when the power of the ICC was relatively strong (1887-"'1893), MacAvoy found far fewer 
instances of cheating. 
Although he is modest in summarizing his results, his findings strongly suggest that the 
ICC itself promoted cartel stability, and are often referenced as supporting the revisionist 
view (or, "capture thesis") that the ICC came as a cartel manager. "The Interstate' Com-
merce Commission sought to prohibit a good part of the rate pattern from rate wars." "The 
experience of the trunk-line railroads with rates, market shares, and profits indicates that 
an antidiscrimination law rigidly imposed on a cartelized market provides the means for 
effective cartel control." 
Elsewhere in a somewhat technical paper, I scrutinized the work of MacAvoy and his 
followers, and developed an oligopoly model encompassing both price and nonprice com-
petition. There, I tried to show that MacAvoy's finding could not be "explained away" by 
purely economic factors. Thus, while other external forces such as mergers and corporate 
reorganization may have changed the institutional environment, the federal regulation is 
possible to have altered the course of the troubled industry, the railroad. 
6. 
On the whole, the evolution of regulatory agencies in America suggests that regulation 
is an institution adaptable to many different ends and purposes. It is a flexible tool whose 
nandle may be' seized by reformers, business executives, bureaucrats, or consumers, and may 
be manipulated quite as easily for the particularistic goals of one of these groups as for the 
public interest. The functional diversity that has been the hallmark of regulation derives 
from several variables: the industry involved, the health of the economy, and the political 
climate. Regulation serves not only economic functions but political, legal, and cultural 
-ones as well. 
Now, the present situation does not represent a system constructed rationally to deal with 
present-day problems. And this essentially irrational aspect of business-government relations 
is the most important point about it. The system represents, instead, an evolutionary merger 
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of two processes: ·the first has to do with the early reactions of American government to 
industrialization and the rise of big business, and the second stems from a series of crises 
that has occurred since 1929. In combination, these forces have produced a complex network 
of competing governments, which reflect in new agencies the same principle of competition 
written into the Constitution as the separation of powers. 
Government reaction in the 19th century can be seen as a remedy for the 'market 
failure'. The rise of enterprises whose processes of production or marketing had immense 
scale economies made the market suddenly inadequate. As Chandler has pointed out, the 
invisible hand suddenly became ineffective, and.a series of visible hands were invented, in 
the form of modern management. This meant the rise of managerial science, and the 
appearance of new business devices-vertical and horizontal integration of corporations, the 
trust, the pool, the holding company, the oligopoly, the trade association, and the price 
leadership system. All these new devices aimed at neutralizing the built-in destabilizers of 
Adam Smith's classical market. And in other industries, widely regarded as 'natural mono-
polies', the market ~eemed to make no sense whatsoever, with the result thai resort to the 
government was necessary for the welfare of both the business and the public. Thus, one 
basis for the present system is the new situation brought by 19th century industrialization; 
and one reason for the irrationality of the system is that some of the conditions that pro-
duced it have themselves been overtaken by technological change. 
The second source of Big Government, after industrialization, has been the repeated 
national crises that have occurred over the last half-century. Starting in 1929, the United 
States has suffered--or has thought itself to be suffering from one serious crisis after another-
The first crisis, of course, was the Great Depression. More than anything else, the Depression 
convinced the American electorate that classical economics did not work, that market failure 
was a clear and present danger, and that government intervention was the only solution. 
Thus, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the creation of new agencies, including such permanent 
institutions as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Com-. 
mission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. And thus the explicit recognition of the importance of particular interest 
groups to the national welfare. This helped to lay the basis for the legitimacy of demands. 
by innumerable interest groups. New dealers talked incessantly about the 'public interest,' 
even as their multitudinous new agencies laid the institutional basis for its. fragmentation 
among particular interests. This was one thing about the New Deal that really was new, 
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and one can trace a line from New Deal politics to the legitimization of present-day demands 
by an endless roster of interests; particular industries, labor unions, ethnic groups, feminists, 
farmers, and so forth. 
The next crises were Would War II . and the subsequent Cold War, and the welfare 
programs in the 1960s, which made the American budget jump to an unprecedented level. 
In a word, the United States reached the strange situation of today not by rational choice 
but by an accumulation of crisis responses building on a system based on the principle of 
partial market failure. 
Although most agencies originated within the context of reform politics, particularly in 
the Progressive and New Deal eras, their subsequent behavior often departed from the reform 
premises that underlay their creation. More than anything else, the inherent nature of the 
industries under regulations shaped the diverse experiences that the agencies encountered, 
the conflicting functions they performed. Some agencies, notably the Federal Trade Com-
mis&ion, sought to maximize competition in an increasingly oligopolistic economy. But others, 
such as the Civil Aeronautics Board and the state utility commissions, limited competition 
in order to promote stabilization and orderly development. That nearly every agency was 
perceived by the public as ideally devoted to low prices for consumers above all other 
functions led to numerous misapprehensions. 
In recent years, all presidents and most members of Congress have promised to bring an 
end to excessive regulation in the United States. Members of the House and Senate have 
acted on these commitments by dealing with bills calling for decontrol in particular industries, 
for termination or sunset processes to apply to all regulating agencies, and for new pro-
cedures in major rule-makings that would require the agency to show that their rules were 
beneficial to the economy and society as a whole. However, the American economy will 
probably continue to operate under the legislation of regulation much as it now exists on 
the statute books for the time being. 
Chandler, Alfred D. Jr., Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1977. 
Chandler, Alfred D. Jr. and Herman Daems (eds.), Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives 
on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. 
Dunlop, J.T. (ed.), Business and Public Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. 
Horn, Nobert and Jlirgen Kocka (eds.), Law and the Formation of the Big Enterprises in the 19th 
and Early 20th Centuries. Giittingen: Vanednhoeck and Ruprecht, 1979. 
Kolko, Gabriel, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900"-'1916. 
New York: Free Press, 1963. 
Kolko, Gabriel, Railroads and Regulation, 1877"-'1916. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 
MacAvoy, Paul W., The Economic Effects of Regulation: The Trunk-Line Railroad Cartels and the 
Interstate Commerce Commission Before 1900. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965. 
MacAvoy, Paul W. (ed.), The Crisis of the Regulatory Commissions. New York, 1970. 
MacAvoy, Paul W., The Regulated Industries and the Economy. New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1979. 
McCraw, Thomas K., "Regulation in America: A Review Article," Business History Review 49 
(Summer, 1975). 
McCraw, Thomas K. (ed.), Regulation in Perspective: Historical Essays. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 198!. 
Martin, Albro, "The Troubled Subject of Railroad Regulation in the Gilded Age-A Reappraisal," 
Journal of American History 61 (September, 1974). 
Parrish, Michael E., Securities Regulation and the New Deal. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1970. 
Phillips, Charles F. Jr., The Economics of Regulation: Theory and Practice in the Transportation 
and Public Utility Industries. Homewood, Illinois, 1965. 
Posner, Richard A., "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 5 (1974). 
Yang, Donghyu, "Cartels and Regulation in the Late 19th Century U.S. Railroads: A Review of Some 
Economic Issues," Korean Economic Association Proceedings February, 1985. 
